SAT Tightens Scrutiny on Non-Bank Loans: What Changes for People Seeking Credit in Mexico
Anti–money laundering oversight is expanding to non-financial lenders and could mean tougher ID and traceability requirements for end borrowers.
In a country where access to formal financing remains limited for millions of households and microbusinesses, the market for personal loans outside the banking system has grown quickly—from person-to-person arrangements and companies advancing funds to their workforce, to non-bank intermediaries offering “fast” credit. In that context, Mexico’s Tax Administration Service (SAT) is maintaining and strengthening oversight of those who grant mutual loans, personal loans, or credit without being financial institutions, treating them as “Vulnerable Activities” due to their potential use in money laundering.
The rules are not aimed solely at banks, Sofomes, Socaps, or Sofipos—entities already within the financial perimeter—but also at parties other than those entities when they lend on a regular or professional basis. The goal, from both a tax and anti–illicit proceeds perspective, is to increase traceability: identifying who lends, who receives, for what amount, and under what terms—especially when transactions exceed key thresholds.
The core mechanism involves registering in the Anti–Money Laundering Prevention Portal System (SPPLD) and filing periodic notices. In addition, “know your customer” obligations apply: documentary identity verification, collection of information on the beneficial owner in the case of corporations or other legal entities, and creation of a file for each customer, which must be kept for a decade. In practice, that can translate into more information requests for end users when they take out a loan with a non-bank provider.
One key point is the threshold above which a transaction must be reported to the authorities: 1,605 times the daily value of the UMA. With the UMA at 117.31 pesos for 2026, the reference amount comes to 188,282.5 pesos. While the reporting obligation falls on the lender, the process requires collecting and retaining the borrower’s data, reinforcing the importance of borrowers knowing who is lending to them and under what framework.
Penalties for noncompliance are steep and progressive, with fines ranging from 200 to 65,000 UMA—roughly 23,462 pesos to 7.6 million pesos—depending on the violation and its severity. In the most serious cases, the fine can be measured against a percentage of the transaction amount, with the higher figure applied. This structure is meant to discourage informality in non-bank credit and push providers to professionalize controls and reporting.
This tightening of controls comes at a time when Mexico’s economy is sending mixed signals: on one hand, a labor market that has been relatively resilient compared with prior episodes; on the other, an interest-rate environment that remains restrictive after the inflation of recent years, which raised the cost of credit and pushed certain segments to look for faster alternatives—though not necessarily cheaper or safer ones. In that environment, lenders outside the regulated financial system have gained ground, and with that, the State’s interest in closing off avenues for opacity has grown.
“Express” Credit, Informality, and the New Friction for Consumers
For consumers, the most visible consequence is not a new tax, but greater “friction” when taking out a loan: more ID requirements, information requests, and documentary evidence. That can be a positive development if it helps weed out providers that operate without controls or with abusive practices, but it can also create incentives for part of the market to shift into even more informal arrangements, where borrowers are more exposed. In Mexico, the appeal of instant loans is often tied to urgent liquidity needs and low financial literacy—conditions that open the door to high all-in costs, opaque fees, or unclear contracts.
That’s why the public policy challenge is twofold: strengthening the prevention of illicit activity without shutting down legitimate financing alternatives. In the short term, non-bank providers that choose to stay within the compliance framework will tend to invest in processes, recordkeeping, and verification, which can raise their operating costs. In the medium term, that professionalization could lift standards and reduce fraud, though it is unlikely by itself to solve the underlying issue: the gap in access to formal credit, which remains a structural constraint on consumption and the financial survival of small businesses.
There are also implications for companies that lend to employees: if the transactions fall under exclusion scenarios—for example, internal loans among workers within the same corporate group and funded with employees’ own resources—they may not be subject to reporting; however, the boundaries must be reviewed carefully, since frequency and the structure of the arrangement are decisive. In general, as alternative financing grows, so does the value of traceability and documentary proof—both to protect the user and to reduce the lender’s legal risk.
On the compliance front, the message is clear: the authorities want non-bank credit to leave fewer “gray areas” for the flow of funds. For the public, the practical recommendation is to favor supervised providers and be wary of products that promise immediate disbursement with no evaluation, no clear contract, or no verifiable entity behind them. Anti–money laundering regulation does not eliminate the risk of over-indebtedness or guarantee fair terms, but it does raise the cost of operating outside minimum controls.
In perspective, increased SAT oversight of non-bank lending could push this market toward greater formalization, with more documentation and reporting, while consumers face more demanding onboarding processes. The ultimate impact will depend on how much the supply of regulated credit is strengthened and whether users have enough information to compare costs, identify trustworthy intermediaries, and avoid abusive schemes.
