Mexico Implements New Tariffs on Imports from Non-FTA Countries: Trade Pressure, Jobs, and a Reset Ahead of USMCA
New tariffs on the import of a range of products from China and other countries that do not have a free trade agreement with Mexico took effect this Thursday. The move aims to curb unfair competition practices and give breathing room to industries highly exposed to import competition. The change comes amid a global shift toward greater protectionism and trade friction, with the United States tightening its tariff policy and increasing scrutiny of North American supply chains.
The duties—approved by Congress last December—cover goods in sectors such as footwear, textiles, automotive, and toys, categories where the Mexican market has seen deeper penetration by low-cost imports. For footwear, tariffs were set between 25% and 35% depending on the product type; for toys, the rate was set at 30%. Official figures underscore the scale of the link: in 2024, Mexico imported about $2.163 billion in footwear, with China accounting for just over 40% of the total; and toy imports totaled $3.281 billion, with China supplying more than 60%, according to INEGI data cited in the announcement.
Mexico’s Ministry of Economy said the measure is intended to “safeguard” roughly 350,000 jobs and support a reindustrialization strategy. In the background is a broader debate over how to strengthen local and regional suppliers at a time when Mexico has gained weight as a manufacturing platform for exports to the United States, driven by nearshoring, post-pandemic logistics reconfiguration, and geopolitical tensions between Washington and Beijing.
Analysts have read these tariffs as a sign of closer alignment with the United States ahead of the USMCA review, a process that typically heightens political sensitivity around rules of origin, labor enforcement, regulatory compliance, and dispute-settlement mechanisms. In recent years, Washington has pushed its partners to reduce reliance on Chinese inputs in sectors seen as strategic; at the same time, the U.S. administration has more frequently deployed trade tools to protect domestic industries.
China’s response was swift: a spokesperson for the Ministry of Commerce questioned the decision and urged Mexico to reverse what it described as a protectionist stance. Mexican authorities, for their part, have insisted the measure is not aimed at any one country in particular—an argument meant to frame it as a trade-policy action applicable to non-FTA partners rather than a bilateral punishment.
In the short term, the impact could show up in prices and margins along the supply chain, especially in segments where importers relied on Asian suppliers for cost and volume. If part of the tariffs is passed on to consumers, there could be targeted price pressure on frequently purchased goods—such as certain toys or textiles—though the overall effect on inflation will depend on how much demand shifts toward domestic production or toward imports from countries with preferential tariff treatment. For Mexico, where Banco de México’s primary mandate is inflation control and monetary policy has been restrictive in recent years, any cost shock will be watched closely, particularly if it coincides with bouts of exchange-rate volatility.
For domestic industry, the measure may open a window to regain market share, but the outcome is not automatic. The ability to substitute for imports depends on investment, productivity, access to financing, input availability, and labor formalization. Sectors such as footwear and textiles have historically faced challenges from smuggling, under-invoicing, and informal competition; without improvements in customs enforcement, verification, and traceability, tariffs alone could fall short—or even encourage evasion schemes.
Mexico’s move comes as the United States adjusts its own tariff landscape. President Donald Trump, according to the report referenced in the underlying article, decided to delay for one year a tariff hike on certain imported furniture—rates set at 30% and 50% for specific categories—to allow room for negotiations over wood products. The decision reflects a recurring dilemma in U.S. trade policy: protecting local production without worsening the cost of living. For Mexico, these shifts matter because the country is tightly integrated with the U.S. market, and any change in tariffs or sector-specific rules can alter trade flows, investment, and external demand for manufactured goods.
Looking ahead, the net effect of Mexico’s tariffs will depend on whether they become a bridge to a more consistent industrial policy—featuring workforce training, logistics infrastructure, competitively priced energy, and regulatory certainty—or whether they remain a stopgap response to external pressure. In a country where manufactured exports are a core growth engine and private investment looks for clear signals to expand, the key will be balancing trade defense, compliance with international commitments, and a domestic framework that allows national production to scale without weakening competition or unnecessarily raising input costs for other industries.
In context, the entry into force of these tariffs confirms that Mexico is recalibrating its trade policy in a more protectionist world with supply chains in flux. The measure may strengthen specific sectors and send signals ahead of the USMCA review, but its effectiveness will hinge on the ability to replace imports, the strength of customs oversight, and how impacts on prices and on the competitiveness of firms that use imported inputs are mitigated.
